Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal by Siegel, Susanna
 
Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Siegel, Susanna. 2004. Indiscriminability and the phenomenal.
Philosophical Studies 120, nos. 1-3: 91-112.
Published Version doi:10.1023/B:PHIL.0000033752.70521.13
Accessed February 17, 2015 9:29:16 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3164348
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions




INDISCRIMINABILITY AND THE PHENOMENAL 
  




In “The Limits of Self-Awareness” (this volume) , M.G.F. Martin characterizes 
disjunctivism about perceptual experience as follows: 
  
[S]tatements about how things appear to a perceiver [are] equivalent to statements of a disjunction that 
either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination) . . . such statements 
are not to be viewed as introducing a report of a distinctive mental event or state common to these various 
disjoint situations. (p. 1) 
  
The disjunctive theory stands opposed to the common-kind 
theory, according to which there are pairs of genuine perceptions 
and mere seemings to perceive that have some fundamental kind of 
mental state in common. 
The issue between disjunctivism and the common-kind theory concerns the status of 
being indiscriminable from a veridical perception. Suppose, for example, that I see a 
green cube, and my experience is veridical – no illusion is involved. An example of the 
sort of indiscriminability property whose status is at issue is the property of being 
indiscriminable from my experience of seeing the green cube.
1 
As Martin sees it, the common-kind theorist and 
the disjunctivist have three bones of contention. First, the common-kind theorist affirms, 
while the disjunctivist denies, that for any event indiscriminable from a (specific) 
veridical perception, 
there is a robust property in virtue of which that event is so 
indiscriminable. According to the common-kind theory, once we 
fix on an indiscriminability property – for instance, the property of 
being indiscriminable from my seeing the green cube – any event 
that has this property has it in virtue of having some robust property 
or other, so the indiscriminability property isn’t fundamental. 
This brings us to the second bone of contention. As Martin 
characterizes it, the common-kind theory goes further than merely 
denying that indiscrminability from veridical perception is a 
brute fact: in addition, any two events with the same (specific) 
indiscriminability property have it in virtue of having the same 
(specific) robust property. This entails that there is a common kind: 
a kind that hallucinations and perceptions share. 
In contrast, Martin denies that there is any fundamental kind 
to which hallucinations and perceptions both belong. According 
to Martin’s version of disjunctivism, some experiences – but only 
some – are indiscriminable from a (specific) veridical perception, 
even when there is no robust property they have in virtue of which 
they are so indiscriminable. This is Martin’s line on causally matching 
hallucinations: hallucinations with the same proximate 
causal antecedents as veridical perceptions. Such hallucinations, 
Martin holds, belong to the fundamental kind: being indiscriminable 
from a veridical perception. 
Other experiences, Martin thinks, belong to this kind, but it 
is not their fundamental kind. Veridical perceptions are, naturally, indiscriminable from veridical perceptions; but they are so 
indiscriminable, Martin thinks, in virtue of having robust properties. 
My veridical perception of the green cube, for instance, Martin 
thinks, is indiscriminable from a veridical perception of the green 
cube in virtue of the perceptual relation that holds between the 
perceiver (me), on the one hand, and the cube and the properties of 
it that appear to me, on the other. Veridical perceptions belong to the 
fundamental kind: being veridical perceptions; whereas causally matching 
hallucinations belong to the fundamental kind: being 
indiscriminable from a veridical perception. 
So Martin agrees with the common-kind theorist that there is 
a common element between causally-matching hallucinations and 
the veridical perceptions they causally match;
2 but disagrees about 
the depth and significance of the commonality. For Martin, it goes 
no deeper than the indiscriminability property, and it does not 
constitute the fundamental kind to which both experiences belong.
3 
So far, I’ve mentioned two of the three bones of contention 
between the Martin’s disjunctivism and the common-kind theory. 
The first was that the disjunctivist (of  Martin’s stripe)
4  allows, while 
the common-kind theorist denies, that being indiscriminable from a 
(specific) veridical perception can be a brute fact. The second is that 
the common-kind theorist allows, while the disjunctivist denies, that 
for any paired hallucination and perception that (in some intuitive 
sense) seem the same to the subject, there is a single mental state 
had by both experiences that constitutes their fundamental kind. 
The third disagreement concerns the concept of perceptual experience. Martin takes 
indiscriminability from veridical perception to 
be definitive of perceptual experience: “being indiscriminable from 
veridical perception,” he writes, “is the most inclusive conception 
we have of what sensory experience is” (p. 22). Now, Martin takes 
it that the common-kind theorist will agree that for an event to so 
much as count as a perceptual experience, it has to be indiscriminable 
from a veridical perception. So they will agree, Martin thinks, 
that it’s a conceptual truth that sensory experiences are indiscriminable 
from veridical perceptions. The disagreement is supposed to 
concern whether anything else is conceptually true of sensory experience. 
As Martin construes his opponent, she says that something 
else is: it is part of the concept of perceptual experiences that they 
instantiate mental properties that realize, or underlie, indiscriminability 
from veridical perception. As to the metaphysical nature of 
the common kind property, there are the options made familiar by 
the history of the philosophy perception so far: candidates include 
sense-data, being an adverbial modification, having propositional 
content of some sort, and combinations thereof. 
In what follows, I will challenge both the assumption that 
phenomenality and indiscriminability from veridical perception are 
as closely linked as Martin thinks they are, and Martin’s defense of 
disjunctivism. Sections 1 and 2 criticize Martin’s claim that every 
experience is indiscriminable from a veridical perception: section 1 
focuses on veridicality; section 2 on indiscriminability. In section 3, 
I turn to Martin’s argument against the common-kind theory, which 
is supposed to motivate taking the disjunctivist conception of experience 
as the default. In section 4 I address a residual question related 




Both Martin’s disjunctivism and the common-kind theory, as Martin understands it, are 
supposed to endorse a strong link between the 
notions of phenomenality and indiscriminability from a veridical 
perception. More exactly, both positions are supposed to agree that 
any event that counts as a perceptual experience is indiscriminable 
from a veridical perception. 
One might question the claim that the phenomenal is quite 
as closely linked to indiscriminability from veridical perception 
as Martin suggests. Consider, for example, a virtual-reality scene 
made to look just like what’s depicted in Escher’s drawing of 
the impossible staircase. There seems to be no possible veridical 
perception from which an experience of seeing such a scene is 
indiscriminable. Yet it seems to be a perfectly good specimen of 
a perceptual experience.
6 
A different sort of example casts additional doubt on the claim 
that any event that counts as a perceptual experience is indiscriminable 
from a veridical perception. Suppose the following sort of 
error theory of color is correct: visual experience represents color 
properties, but nothing external is, or could in principle be colored.
7 
On this view, when earlier I described my experience by saying that 
I saw a green cube, strictly speaking this was a misdescription: what 
I saw was a cube, and though it appeared green, there was no color 
property had by the cube that my experience even so much as falsely 
represented. 
If such an error theory were correct, then there would not be any 
veridical perception from which my experience of seeing the green appearing cube is 
indiscriminable. Many philosophers would find 
such a theory implausible.
8 But presumably its implausibility has 
nothing to do with miscategorizing the event of seeing the greenappearing 
cube as an experience. Like the events of seeing Escher 
drawing, this event seems a fine specimen of an experience; and, 
crucially, its status as fine specimen seems independent of whether 
the error theory described is correct. 
I’ve been questioning the claim that any event that counts 
as a perceptual experience is indiscriminable from a veridical 
perception. As we’ve seen, Martin’s disjunctivism includes an 
even stronger claim connecting phenomenality to indiscriminability, a claim concerning 
the very concept of perceptual experiences: 
  
In fixing on our concept of perceptual experience, we seem to have no more 




Martin considers it a conceptual truth about perceptual experiences 
that they are indiscriminable from veridical perception. If this were 
right, then error theorists of color would be conceptually confused 
about what experience is. But whatever errors such theorists may 
be making, they do not seem to include conceptual confusion about 
what to count as an experience. 
  
2. INDISCRIMINABILITY 
So far, I’ve criticized the idea that phenomenality is linked to indiscriminability from veridical perception. I now want to 
challenge the idea that it is linked to any notion of indiscriminability. 
As Martin thinks of it, indiscriminability is a notion defined 
in terms of judgment. “To discriminate two things,” Martin writes, 
“is judge them non-identical” (p. 26). This suggests that when A 
and B are indiscriminable for a subject, the subject cannot tell them 
apart in judgment. Saying no more than this leaves much unsettled 
about what indiscriminability is, and shortly we will consider two 
ways to precisify the notion. For the moment, what’s notable is that 
Martin’s notions of discriminability and indiscriminability are cognitive notions. 
As we saw earlier, Martin takes the common-kind theorist to be 
committed to the claim that any event that counts as a perceptual 
experience is indiscriminable from a veridical perception.
10 Let S 
be a subject, and let I* be a robust property of the sort that, by 
the lights of the common-kind theory, is supposed to bestow on 
any event that has it the property of being indiscriminable from a 
veridical perception. So fix on an indiscriminability property, such 
as the property of my seeing the green cube, and by the lights of 
the common-kind theory (as Martin construes it) there is a property 
I* that characterizes what it is like to have an experience with that 
indiscriminability property. In the hands of Martin’s common-kind 
theorist, then, I* is supposed to play two roles: first, it is supposed to 
make any event that has it indiscriminable from a veridical perception; 
second, it is supposed to characterize what the experience is  like for the subject. 
Martin, then, takes his opponent to accept the following: 
  
Sufficiency claim: If S’s experience has I*, then S’s 
experience is indiscriminable from a veridical perception. 
  
What the Sufficiency claim comes to depends on how the 
notion of indiscriminability is understood. I will now consider two 
notions of indiscriminability, and argue that on each way, someone 
sympathetic to the main thrust of the common-kind theory could 
reasonably deny the Sufficiency claim – though for different reasons 
each time. Both doubts come into focus by considering creatures 
who have perceptual experiences, yet lack the cognitive resources 
to make judgments about them. In addition, as we will see, the 
possibility of this sort of creature also threatens Martin’s positive 
view that two events’ being indiscriminable from the same veridical 
perception suffices for their being phenomenally the same. 
I’ll call the first notion of indiscriminability the positive notion:
11 
  
Positive: X is indiscriminable from Y by a subject S at 
time t iff S is disposed to judge on basis b that X = Y. 
  
This notion of indiscriminability has a parameter for the basis of 
S’s disposition to judge. The motivation for having such a parameter 
is as follows. Suppose that X and Y look totally different to S, but S 
is disposed to judge on the basis of consulting an unreliable oracle 
that X = Y. Without the parameter for the basis, by the positive 
notion, X and Y would count as indiscriminable for S. This seems 
like the wrong result. In any case, it seems clear that the basis Martin 
has in mind is “introspection and reflection”,
12 so let us put that in 
for b. Now, suppose there were a creature who had I*, but who was 
not equipped to form any judgments at all, ergo was not disposed 
to judge that she was veridically perceiving. On the positive  
account of indiscriminability, the sufficiency claim would predict 
that if such a creature had a perceptual experience, then S would 
be disposed to judge on the basis of introspection and reflection 
that S’s experience is a veridical perception. For the sort of creature 
imagined, this prediction would be false.  
Martin’s construal of the common-kind theory, then, would be 
too restrictive, given the positive notion of indiscriminability. The 
existence of creatures who have perceptual experiences without 
capacities for judgment is compatible with there being pairs of 
veridical perception and causally-matching hallucination that share 
a common mental kind. So rejecting the Sufficiency claim does 
not seem tantamount to giving up on the central claim of the 
common-kind theory itself. 
I’ve complained that Martin shouldn’t attribute the Sufficiency 
claim to the common-kind theorist. In my complaint, I’ve assumed 
that if some sort of first-person access to what experiences are like 
is required, this access can take a form other than judgment. It is 
a difficult question how to understand the nature of such access, 
once it’s stipulated not to involve judgment. Perhaps there is a more 
primitive form of introspective access of some sort. 
The same sort of creature presents a different reason for a 
common-kind theorist to deny the Sufficiency claim, when that 
claim is taken to involve indiscriminability understood differently. 
I’ll call the second notion of indiscriminability, which is proposed 
by TimothyWilliamson, the double-negative notion of indiscriminability: 
  
Double-negative: X is indiscriminable from Y by a 
subject S at time t iff S is not able at t to activate 
knowledge that X =/= Y.
13 
  
Using this notion of indiscriminability, the Sufficiency claim 
comes to this: 
  
Sufficiency claim-TW: If S’s experience has I*, then S 
cannot activate knowledge that having-I* is distinct from 
having a veridical perception. 
  
With respect to the sort of creature lacking cognitive equipment 
of the sort needed to form judgments, Sufficiency claim-TW 
is trivial. For such a creature, there will be no pair of perceptual 
experiences such that the creature can activate knowledge that they 
are distinct from one another. So all perceptual experiences of the 
creature will count as indiscriminable from one another.
14 This gives 
the common-kind theorist reason to reject the Sufficiency claim, on 
the grounds that it doesn’t capture anything important in their view. 
The case of creatures with perceptual experiences who lack 
capacities for judgment also suggests an objection to Martin’s 
positive view that being indiscriminable from the same veridical 
perception is sufficient for two events’ being phenomenally the 
same. Assuming either notion of indiscriminability, all of the experiences 
of such creatures will count as the same, if indiscriminability suffices for sameness of experience. 
Martin considers and responds to this very worry. His response is 
that the relevant notion of discriminability is impersonal: 
  
when we turn to the experiences of sentient but unselfconscious creatures, to the 
extent that we do have a positive grip on the kinds of experience that they can 
have, and which can differ one from another, we also have a grip on how such 
experience would be discriminable through reflection or not . . . a dog might fail 
to discriminate one experience from another, making no judgment about them as 
identical or distinct at all, [but] that is not to say that we cannot judge, in ascribing 
them such experience, that there is an event which would or would not be judgably 
different from another experience. (p. 28) 
  
If the claim here is that two of the dog’s experiences are discriminable 
by someone other than the dog, that seems correct. But it does 
not seem correct to say that they are discriminable by reflection, if 
reflection is supposed to be on the part of the subject whose states 
are in question. After all, by hypothesis it is not the dog doing the 
reflecting, and it is not clear what it would be for us to reflect on the 
dog’s experiences, without doing some empirical investigating of a 
sort that the dog would be incapable of carrying out. If the relevant 
sort of (in)discriminability is (in)discriminability for a subject on the 
basis of that subject’s reflection and introspection, then the appeal 
to the impersonal notion won’t work in this case.
15 
On another reading, Martin’s response to the worry is that there 
is a sense in which some of the dog’s experiences are discriminable 
from one another, to the dog. But the notion of discriminability that 
would make this claim true could not be a cognitive notion. And as 
we’ve seen, it is a cognitive notion that is at work in Martin’s central 
claims. 
  
3. MARTIN’S OBJECTION TO THE COMMON-KIND THEORY 
So far, I’ve been criticizing Martin’s views of the relation between 
indiscriminability and the phenomenal. These views form the background 
to his argument for disjunctivism. I now want to turn to that 
argument itself. 
Martin’s defense of disjunctivism aims to show that the disjunctivist conception of 
perceptual experience should be the default 
conception. It should be the default conception, Martin thinks, 
because otherwise one’s epistemological assumptions about the 
mind will be very weighty.
16 The fact (as Martin sees it) that 
the common-kind theory is committed to such weighty epistemic 
assumptions is the main objection he raises against that theory. 
This fact, in turn, is the main reason given for why the disjunctivist 
conception should be the default. I will now examine this objection. 
Martin gives the objection in a passage that contrasts the 
supposed “modesty” of disjunctivism with the supposed “immodesty” 
of the common-kind theory. Disjunctivism is supposed to 
be modest, because it takes indiscriminability from a veridical 
perception as necessary and sufficient for an event to count as an 
experience. The common-kind theory, in contrast, is supposed to be 
immodest, because it takes as necessary and sufficient for an event 
to be an experience that it instantiate a robust property that realizes 
the indiscriminability from a veridical perception. In the first part of 
the objection, Martin considers how the common-kind view would classify a situation in which a subject was unable to discriminate 
her situation from one in which she was seeing a street scene, and 
yet had no robust property of the sort that the common-kind theory 
takes to characterize perceptual experience: 
  
For the immodest view in question this could not be a case of visual experience as 
of a street scene, while by modest lights that would be exactly what it is. . . . Now 
surely this result would surely be unfortunate for any immodest view, given our 
initial assumptions. For we supposed that reflection on experience offers support 
to a naïve realist construal of sensory experience. When one reflects on one’s 
experience it seems to one as if one is thereby presented with some experience-independent elements of the 
scene before one as constituents of one’s experience 
and not merely as represented to one as in imagination. (p. 10) 
  
There seem to be two steps here that Martin thinks the common 
kind theorist is forced to take. The first step is that an event is 
indiscriminable from a veridical perception, just in case it seems 
to the subject as if she is “presented with experience-independent 
elements of the scene before her as constituents of her experience”. 
This is supposed to be an upshot of the initial assumption that reflection 
on experience supports a naïve realist construal of experience. 
The second step is that it seems to one as if one is presented with 
such elements, just in case one is having a perceptual experience 
(perhaps a hallucinatory one). And this seems plausible. Putting 
these steps together, being indiscriminable from veridical perception 
suffices for being an experience. As we’ve seen, Martin also thinks 
there are grounds (acceptable to disjunctivist and non-disjunctivist 
alike) for the converse – that all experiences are indiscriminable 
from a veridical perception. I raised some worries about that earlier, 
but let us set them aside here. Combining these commitments gives 
us 
  
(1)  (1)   I iff E, 
  
where ‘I’ is for indiscriminability from a veridical perception, and 
‘E’ is for being a perceptual experience, and (1) abbreviates “all 
and only the events indiscriminable from veridical perceptions are 
experiences.” 
This brings us to the second part of the objection: 
  
A proponent of the immodest view can only hope to offer necessary as well as 
sufficient conditions for having an experience – and hence to explain the having 
of an experience in terms of its favored conditions – if it can ensure that themodest 
approach and its favored form of immodesty coincide in the extension they give 
the concept of experience. (p. 11) 
  
Here the relevant part of the sentence is the first part, with its 
assumption that the common-kind theorist aims to give necessary as 
well as sufficient conditions for having an experience. The common kind 
theory, recall, takes it to be a conceptual truth about perceptual 
experience that such experiences have a certain robust property (the 
exact metaphysical nature of the property is left open – it could the 
property of having sense-data, or of having propositional contents of 
sort, some combination, etc.)Where this property is R (for ‘robust’), 
the assumption comes to this: 
  (2) E iff R, 
  
or more exactly, all and only the experiences have robust property 
R. 
In the passage quoted, Martin suggests that the common-kind 
theorist can accept (2) only if she accepts (3): 
  
(3) I iff R, 
  
that is, all and only the events indiscriminable from veridical perceptions 
have the property R. In embracing (1)–(3), the common-kind 
theorist ensures that it classifies as experiences all the same events 
as the disjunctivism-a-la-Martin does: as Martin puts it, she ensures 
that the modest and immodest approaches “coincide in the extension 
they give the concept of experience.” 
The final part of the objection connects (1)–(3) to a substantive 
epistemic principle: 
  
A proponent of the immodest view can only hope to offer necessary as well as 
sufficient conditions for having an experience – and hence to explain the having 
of an experience in terms of its favored conditions – if it can ensure that the 
modest approach and its favored form of immodesty coincide in the extension 
they give the concept of experience. In turn, this coincidence of extension can by 
guaranteed only if the proponent of the immodest account embraces a substantive 
epistemic principle . . . one must assume that a subject couldn’t but be in a position 
to discriminate a situation which lacked E1 . . . EN from one which possessed 
them. . . . A responsible subject who wishes to determine how things are with him 
or herself through reflection must be, on this view, infallible in the answers they 
come up with. They must not only correctly identify phenomenal properties of a 
specific sort when they are present, but also they cannot be misled into judging 
them present when they are not. (p. 11) 
  
It is the common-kind theorist’s commitment to (1)–(3) that 
supposedly forces her to accept the substantive epistemic principle, 
which from now on I will call Hefty. 
  
Hefty: A responsible subject who wishes determine how things are with him or 
herself through reflection must not only correctly identify phenomenal properties of a specific sort when 
they are present, but also they cannot be misled into judging them present when they are not. 
  
The success of Martin’s objection to the common-kind theory 
(and, given the dialectical context, his success in motivating 
disjunctivism) hangs on two things: first, whether a commitment to 
Hefty really does follow from (1)–(3); second, on how plausible or 
implausible Hefty is. I will consider the second issue first, and then 
return to how exactly the commitment to Hefty on the part of the 
common-kind theorist is supposed to arise. 
In assessing the plausibility of Hefty, a crucial interpretive question is what sorts of 
properties E1 . . . EN, the “phenomenal properties of a specific sort”, are meant to be. 
Either they are robust 
properties that characterize a specific type of veridical experience, 
such as my seeing the green cube; or else they are the robust general 
properties, shared by all such specific ones, such as the property of 
having propositional content, or being sense-data. Call these strong 
and weak robust properties, respectively. 
Up until the statement of Hefty, it seems clear that it is weak robust properties are at issue: notably, premises (2) and (3) concern 
the property that (by the lights of the common-kind theory) is 
supposed to be necessary for having an experience at all. And it 
is surely not necessary for an event to count as a perceptual experience 
that it have the strong robust property (if such there be) that 
characterizes my veridically seeing the green cube. As pleasant as it 
is for me to see the green cube, it is thankfully not the only type of 
experience one can have. It seems undeniable that the properties at 
issue are the weak ones, rather than the strong ones. Martin’s case 
against Hefty goes like this: 
  
[T]he doctrine of infallibilism about the mental is particularly problematic in relation 
to sensory states once we are forced to admit that appearances. systematically 
appear to us other than they are. For if we can be misled with respect to some 
properties of sensory experiences, there is a question as to what can motivate 
the claim that we are infallible in other judgments about them . . . part of the 
motivation of disjunctivism is precisely the thought that introspection of our sense 
experience supports Naïve Realism, and hence forces us to see both sense-datum 
and intentional theories as forms of error theory. (p. 12) 
  
The idea here seems to be that Hefty does not sit well with the 
common-kind theory, because the common-kind theory already 
accepts some sort of fallibility to introspection in rejecting Naïve 
Realism. In rejecting Naïve Realism, the common-kind theorist 
denies that veridical experiences consist in part in the objects 
perceived. Combining this with the claim that Naïve Realism introspectively seems to be 
true – a claim that, as we’ve seen, Martin 
thinks the common-kind theorist should accept (see discussion of 
(1) above) – the result is that introspection is fallible about the metaphysical nature of 
perceptual experience. If the common-kind theory  
is already committed to introspection delivering fallible results 
about the metaphysical nature of experience, the thought seems to 
be, then the idea that it would be infallible about some other aspect 
of experience seems to be undermined.
17 This is Martin’s reason for 
thinking that Hefty is implausible. 
In order to assess this reason to reject Hefty, one more interpretive 
issue concerning Hefty needs to be settled. Hefty, recall, was 
the epistemic principle that “a responsible subject who wishes to 
determine how things are for themselves sensorily must . . . not only 
correctly identify phenomenal properties of a specific sort when they 
are present, but also they cannot be misled into judging them present 
when they are not” (p. 10). This principle can be interpreted in two 
ways: extensionally or intensionally. 
Taken extensionally, Hefty entails that a subject who satisfies it 
can discriminate on the basis of introspection between events that 
have the weak robust property and events that lack it. But it is not 
required, on the extensional interpretation of Hefty, that the subject 
know what sort of properties she is discriminating between. It is 
enough simply that she make the discriminations, on the basis of 
introspection, infallibly. 
Taken intensionally, Hefty is much more demanding. A subject 
who satisfies intensional Hefty will be disposed to judge correctly 
that she has weak robust properties of sort R, where R specifies 
the metaphysical nature of the robust properties: e.g., sense-data, 
or representational properties. Intensional Hefty says, in effect, that introspection can reveal the basic metaphysical nature of the properties 
that characterize what it is like to have an experience. If intensional 
Hefty is true, then introspection can reveal that perceptual 
experience is the having of representational properties, or sense-data, 
or some combination – whichever (if any) of these properties 
perceptual experiences turn out to have. 
In an earlier paper, Martin gave convincing grounds for doubting 
intensional Hefty. If intensional Hefty were correct, Martin has 
noted, it would difficult to explain how there can so much as be 
philosophical disagreement about the nature of experience. The 
disagreements philosophers have about metaphysics of experience 
don’t seem plausibly to result from variation in their inner lives.
18 
It does not seem to be introspection alone that decides between, 
say, the sense-datum theory and the theory that experience consists 
entirely in representational properties. Other sorts reasoning are 
needed. So introspection doesn’t seem to provide substantive knowledge 
of weak robust properties. 
The reason Martin gives in the text for rejecting Hefty also counts 
against intensional Hefty. If the common-kind theorist embraced 
intensional Hefty, she would be saying, in effect, “introspection 
wrongly tells me that experiences partly consist in external objects 
that I perceive; yet it also tells me infallibly that my experience 
consists in weak robust property R.” There is a tension here, given 
that R is by definition the sort of property that can be had by 
hallucinations, and so cannot be object-involving. 
But neither of the arguments Martin gives against Hefty work 
so decisively against the extensional version of Hefty. Introspection 
may not infallibly reveal the nature of weak robust properties (if 
there are such), but that’s compatible with it providing infallible 
grounds for discriminating between events that are experiences and 
events that aren’t. And this is also compatible with introspection 
being wrong – even systematically so – about the nature of weak 
robust properties. So for all Martin says, extensional Hefty has not 
been shown to be implausible, or even in tension with the commonkind 
theory. Being committed to extensional Hefty does not seem 
to be a reason to reject the common-kind theory, or to regard the 
disjunctivist conception of experience as the default. 
But what exactly is the common-kind theorist committed to? As 
wes saw earlier, one of the claims Martin thinks the common-kind 
theorist is committed to is that an event is an experience just in case 
it has a robust property of type R: 
  
(2) E iff R. 
  
From here, it is a simple step to Hefty, with the following assumption: 
subjects can infallibly discriminate between events that are 
experiences and events that aren’t. For if a subject “couldn’t but be 
in a position to discriminate” experiences from non-experiences, 
then she also “couldn’t but be in a position to discriminate an situation 
which lacked E1 . . . EN from a situation which possessed 
them”, where E1 . . . EN is a weak robust property. This is one way 
in which the common-kind theorist’s commitment to Hefty could 
arise. It seems plausible to suppose that any common-kind theorist is 
indeed committed to (2), and from (2) plus the assumption about 
infallible discrimination of experiences from non-experiences, some 
version of Hefty follows. The version that follows, however, is the 
extensional version. That version isn’t obviously implausible, and 
in any case Martin’s arguments against Hefty, as we’ve seen, work 
only against the intensional version. 
Another argument that the common-kind theorist is committed to 
some version of Hefty proceeds from two premises: I iff R (claim 
(3) above), and the transitivity of indiscriminability. The main idea 
is the same as above: if I and R are co-extensive, then infallible 
discrimination of events with I from events without I just is infallible 
discrimination of events with R from events without R. And the 
latter just is Hefty. 
Why think that subjects can infallibly discriminate events with 
I from events without I? Let x be an event that is indiscriminable 
from a veridical perception. Let e be an event that is discriminable 
from a veridical perception. Now suppose that subjects can’t 
infallibly discriminate events with I from events without I. In particular, 
suppose that e and x are themselves indiscriminable. Then e is 
indiscriminable from x, and x is (by definition) indiscriminable from 
a veridical perception. If indiscriminability is transitive, then e will 
be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. But by hypothesis, e 
was discriminable from a veridical perception. So we get a contradiction. 
That is another argument that the common-kind theorist is 
committed to Hefty.
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There seem to be two arguments suggested by Martin’s text that 
the common-kind theorist ends up committed to Hefty. Neither argument, 
however, shows that the common-kind theorist is committed 
the intensional version of Hefty. And it’s the intensional version that 
Martin argues against. 
  
4. A RESIDUAL PROBLEM 
As Martin characterizes the common-kind theory, it ought to be 
committed to the view that for each indiscriminability property (e.g., 
the property of being indiscriminable from my veridically seeing 
the green cube), there is a single robust mental property such that 
any event with the indiscriminability property has the robust mental 
property. Some doubt is cast on this claim by considerations related 
to intransitivity of some indiscriminability properties. Notably, if 
being indiscriminable with respect to hue is intransitive, then there 
is reason to reject the common-kind theory as Martin characterizes 
it. In this section, I discuss whether this counts in favor of 
disjunctivism. 
Consider three red swatches that differ slightly in hue: they 
are, say, red38, red39 and red40. Many philosophers think that 
indiscriminability respect to color is an intransitive relation. Such 
intransitivity is supposed to be illustrated by cases of the following 
sort: a subject comparing the red38 swatch with the red39 swatch 
(at a time) cannot discriminate between their hues. The same subject 
comparing the red39 swatch with the red40 swatch (with the red38 
swatch out of view) cannot discriminate those hues either. But the 
same subject comparing the red38 swatch with the red40 swatch 
(with the red39 swatch out of view) can discriminate the hues of those. 
The case just described involves only three swatches, but that’s 
not essential to what it is supposed to illustrate. What’s essential is 
that there be discriminable hues on the outer edges of a range of 
indiscriminable ones. How many indiscriminable ones occupy the 
range is not important. If there are cases of the sort just described 
– and many philosophers think there are, though some disagree
20 – 
they illustrate the intransitivity of looking the same with respect to 
hue. 
For the sake of argument, I am going to ignore the controversy, 
and assume that indiscriminability with respect to hue really is 
intransitive. I will also assume, for simplicity, that the intransitivity 
shows up with just three swatches. This is empirically dubious, 
but makes it easier to get to the main point.
21 If it turns out that 
indiscriminability with respect to hue isn’t intransitive, then there 
is one less reason to reject the common-kind theory as Martin 
characterizes it. 
It will be useful to spell out a (putative) case of intransitive 
indiscriminability in a bit more detail. Let I38 be the property of 
being indiscriminable from a veridical perception of red38, and let 
E38 and E40 be, respectively, an event of veridically seeing a swatch 
of red38 and an event of veridically seeing a swatch of red40. And 
finally, make the following assumptions about E38 and E40: E38 
is indiscriminable from a veridical perception of red39 and red40; 
and E40 is indiscriminable from a veridical perception of red41 and 
red42. So E38 has three indiscriminability properties: I38, I39 and 
I40. Given these assumptions, E38 and E40 share the indiscriminability 
property I40. Both are indiscriminable from a veridical 
perception of red40. 
What must Martin’s common-kind theorist say about the robust 
properties in virtue of which E38 and E40 each have I40? One 
version of the common-kind theory would predict that these robust 
properties have to be different. For by the hypothesis of intransitivity, 
red38 is discriminable from red40. If these shades are 
discriminable, then at least some common-kind theorists will want 
to say that the specific robust properties are too. These will include 
common-kind theorists who take the specific robust properties to 
be representational ones, so that differences in what is represented 
result in phenomenal differences. 
This last move has a notable consequence: one and the same 
indiscriminability property could be had in virtue of having different 
specific robust properties. And this is to deny one of the claims that 
Martin attributed to the common-kind theory: that any two experiences 
sharing an indiscriminability property share the same specific 
robust property. 
Is the view just sketched a disjunctivist view? There is a similarity 
with disjunctivism: both disjunctivism and the view sketched 
deny that any two experiences that are indiscriminable from the 
same veridical perception share the same robust mental property. 
However, there are also notable differences. Whereas the disjunctivist 
holds that there are pairs of hallucinations and veridical 
perceptions that are indiscriminable from the same veridical perception, 
yet are of fundamentally different kinds, the view just sketched 
can allow that pairs of experiences with different specific robust properties nevertheless are of the same fundamental kind. Both 
experiences have, as it might be, representational phenomenal 
properties, and for all the view says, they have a general fundamental kind in common. 
The difference is only at the level of the specific robust properties. 
So the view sketched does not seem to capture the heart of 
disjunctivism. It does, however, seem to be incompatible with a 
version of intensional Hefty – a version that says that introspection 
infallibly reveals which specific robust properties a subject has. 
But as we have seen, there are independent reasons to think that 
intensional versions of Hefty are wrong anyway. 
  
5. CONCLUSION 
I’ve suggested that someone could accept the main thrust of the 
common-kind theory, while rejecting two other claims that Martin 
attributes to it. The two claims are these: first, that the kind common 
to perception and hallucination is a property of an event in virtue 
of which it is indiscriminable from a veridical perception; second, 
that it is a property in virtue of which it is indiscriminable from 
anything at all (where indiscriminability is a cognitive notion). The 
main thrust of the common-kind theory, I suggested, is that there 
are pairs of hallucination and veridical perception sharing a fundamental 
kind of mental state, and this part of the theory survives the 
denial of the two claims just mentioned. 
For all my complaints about the link Martin sees between 
indiscriminability and the phenomenal, rejecting it leaves a 
serious question unanswered. Even to state the debate between 
disjunctivism and its opponents, one needs a way to characterize 
the relevant pairs of perceptions and hallucinations. Only some 
such pairs raise the question whether they share a fundamental 
mental property. Which pairs are these? The claim that they are 
the pairs that are indiscriminable from the same veridical perception 
provides a simple answer. If this answer is rejected, it’s not 
clear what to replace it with. Replacing it with some other notion 
of indiscriminability, or with some notion of phenomenal sameness, 
brings in weighty theoretical commitments at the outset – just 
as Martin’s cognitive notion of indiscriminability does. The moral 
seems to be that in this debate, it is difficult to escape making 
theoretical commitments from the very start about the kind of access 








1 So “being indiscriminable from a veridical perception” should be taken to 
mean something stronger than simply being indiscriminable from some veridical 
perception or other. How much stronger? If I had two successive veridical experiences 
of numerically different but qualitatively identical green cubes, would 
the property of being indiscriminable from each be different indiscriminability 
properties? For the purposes of this discussion, they could just as well count as 
instances of the same property. 
  
2 Martin grants the conclusion of the Causal Argument from Hallucination (see 
section 4), which he formulates as follows: “whatever kind of experience does 
occur in situations like h [hallucination], it is possible that such a kind of experience occurs when one is veridically perceiving” (p. 12). Of course, “whatever 
kind . . .” is restricted to exclude the kind: hallucination. 
  
3 “. . . while the perceptual event is of a fundamental kind which could not 
occur when hallucinating, nonetheless this very same event is also of some other 
psychological kind or kinds which a causally matching hallucinatory event . . . 
belongs to” (p. 17). 
  
4 Martin’s stripe of disjunctivism grants the conclusion of the Causal Argument 
from Hallucination (see previous note). There could be versions of disjunctivism 
that don’t, however. 
  
5 Before beginning the critical part of the discussion, a final expository note, 
and a warning. Martin’s disjunctivism is officially undecided on two matters: 
first, it leaves unsettled whether it applies to each sensory modalities, or only 
to some, or only to perceptual experience in general. Second, it is unsettled on the 
status of illusions (where these are distinct from hallucinations) – whether they 
always instantiate robust properties in virtue of which they are indiscriminable 
from veridical perceptions or not, and if so, what sort of robust properties do this. 
I believe that Martin has views on both of these matters, but that they don’t bear 
on the issues raised in his paper. 
The warning: my discussion, like Martin’s discussion, takes as understood 
the idea that a particular, unrepeatable experience could be indiscriminable from 
another (perhaps repeatable) event. It’s not entirely clear what this means. The 
relevant notion of indiscriminability can’t be a statistical notion, since the event 
said to be indiscriminable is unrepeatable. Nor can the notion be reasonably 
understood by considering what would happen if the subject had two simultaneous 
experiences, compared them, and found that they were the same in the relevant 
respect (as one might be able to do with two physical objects). Perhaps one 
could think of how the subject would regard the pair of experiences, if she had 
them successively; but that introduces complications about memory that seem 
extraneous. Nevertheless, there is some intuitive sense in which certain pairs of 
experiences seem the same to the subject. Such a notion is needed even to state 
the debate between the disjunctivist and the common-kind theorist, and that is one 
role that is played by Martin’s notion of indiscriminability. I return to this point 
in section 5. 
  
6 Another example: consider an experience of seeing the Müller-Lyer lines. 
Which veridical perception is such that having an experience of these lines is 
indiscriminable from it? Presumably, if two lines really did differ in length, 
but each had the characteristic arrows drawn around them, they would look 
different than the lines look when they are the same length, at least given how 
our perceptual systems work. 
In the very latest version of Martin’s paper (written after these comments), 
Martin grants that Escher-experiences as a whole are not indiscriminable from a 
veridical perception, but suggests that they have constituent parts, each of which 
is indiscriminable from a veridical perception (p. 31). This strikes me as an ad 
hoc move tailored to specific example, and a retraction of a central claim. 
  
7 Such an error theory might hold that color is a property of mental, internal 
objects such as sense-data, that it couldn’t even in principle be a property of things 
external to the mind, and that color experience nevertheless represents external 
things as being colored. 
  
8 One sort of worry that a materialist about the mental might press is how experience 
could ever get to represent color properties, if such properties were never 
instantiated. 
  
9 The indefinite description “a visual perception” should be taken to mean the 
same as “some veridical perception or other.” Cf. p. 20: “[t]he concept of perceptual 
experience in general is that of situations indiscriminable from veridical 
perception”; and the passage cited earlier from p. 22: “I argued above that being 
indiscriminable from veridical perception is the most inclusive conception we 
have of what sensory experience is.”   
10 In section 3 I discuss some passages from pp. 10–11 of Martin’s paper that 
show that he construes the common-kind theory is this way. 
  
11 In the very latest version of Martin’s paper (written after these comments), 
Martin makes explicit that he accepts the other notion of indiscriminability, not 
the positive notion (fn. 11, p. 10). To state the issue between disjunctivism and its 
opponents, some way is needed to characterize the similarity between the relevant 
experiences, and various notions of indiscriminability are candidate ways to do 
this. So it seems worth having the positive notion on the table. 
  
12 Cf. “some event is an experience of a street scene just in case it couldn’t be 
told apart through introspection from a veridical perception of the street as the 
street” (p. 9); “If the condition of indiscriminability is to be met, then a situation 
of experience must not lack any property necessary for veridical perception 
the absence of which is recognisable simply through reflection” (p. 20); “if any 
property of a veridical perception is introspectible – i.e. is recognisagbly present 
in perception through reflection . . .” (p. 22). Although in section 9 of his paper 
Martin also appeals to impersonal notions of indiscriminability, which seems in 
tension with this; I discuss this notion briefly at the end of this section. 
  
13 TimothyWilliamson, Identity and Discrimination (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 
p. 8. Two notable differences between the two notions are these. First, the 
positive notion makes use of the notion of disposition, whereas the double negative 
notion makes use of the notion of an ability. Second, where the positive 
notion defines indiscriminability in terms of judgment, Williamson’s 
notion defines it in terms of knowledge. Interestingly, only the first of these 
differences seems to survive the attempt to define corresponding notions of 
discriminability. For suppose X and Y were discriminable by S at t just in case S 
was disposed to judge X distinct from Y. Then X and Y could count as discriminable 
for S at t, even in the case that X = Y. And this seems to stretch the notion 
of discriminability unacceptably far beyond the ordinary notion. If this infelicity 
were fixed by adding that the S at t be disposed to make a correct judgment, then 
it starts to look like it involves an appeal to knowledge (or something very much 
like it, given the link between knowledge and reliable judgment) after all. (Given 
the two dimensions of variation in the pair of notions of indiscriminability we’ve 
been considering, there are clearly other notions of indiscriminability that could 
also be considered.) 
  
14 There may be an additional reason for the common-kind theorist to reject 
the link between phenomenality and indiscriminability, at least on Williamson’s 
notion of indiscriminability. Consider once more what the sufficiency claim 
comes to, givenWilliamson’s notion: 
If S has I*, then S cannot activate knowledge that having-I* is distinct 
from having a veridical perception. 
It is not clear why a common-kind theorist should accept this. Suppose the 
epistemic basis in question is supposed to be reflection, where this includes not 
only introspection but philosophical theorizing as well. Let us grant that if S has 
I*, then on the basis of reflection, S cannot activate knowledge that she’s not 
having a veridical perception. Nonetheless, if S is a common kind theorist, S will 
take herself to know by philosophical theorizing that having I* is distinct from 
having a veridical perception, because S will take herself to know that she could 
have I* even if she weren’t veridically perceiving. So it seems that, by her lights, at 
least, she can activate knowledge that having I* is distinct from having a veridical 
perception. 
Of course, Martin thinks that the philosophical theorizing that typically leads 
common-kind theorists to this conclusion is mistaken, and perhaps he’s right. But 
if the claim is that a subject cannot activate the relevant knowledge on the basis 
of philosophical reflection, then it seems unmotivated to attribute the sufficiency 
claim to the common-kind theorist in the first place. 
  
15 In considering this worry in the text, Martin also discusses the inattentive, 
hasty subject John, who treats samples of scarlet and vermillion indifferently. 
Intutively, his experiences of each should count as distinct; yet, as Martin points out, it does not seem inappropriate to say that John can’t discriminate scarlet 
from vermillion. Martin takes the moral to be that the disjunctivist should adopt 
an ‘impersonal’ notion of indiscriminability, where this impersonal notion applies 
equally to the dog. I think the moral is rather that it’s the notion of an ability to 
discriminate, rather than a disposition to discriminate, that should figure in the 
definitions of indiscriminability. 
  
16 Cf. last paragraph of Martin’s section 2. 
  
17 The same consideration that makes Hefty implausible for a common-kind 
theorist should make it implausible for anyone who accepts Martin’s assumption 
that introspection supports Naïve Realism. If, as per Martin’s assumption, 
introspection on experience tells you that it consists in part of an object that 
you are veridically perceiving, it will be incorrect in cases of hallucination, no 
matter whether disjunctivism or the common-kind theory is true. By Martin’s 
lights, the common-kind theorist is forced to admit that appearances systematically 
appear to us other than they are, because no experiences are the way 
introspection (supposedly) says they are; the disjunctivist, in contrast, allows that 
some experiences are that way. Whether the disjunctivist also has to admit that 
appearances appear other than they are systematically depends on the extent to 
which experiences are not veridical. For discussion of the idea that most experiences 
are not veridical, see A.D. Smith, The Problem of Perception (Harvard 
University Press, 2002), chapter 1. 
  
18 Cf. ‘Beyond Dispute’, in T. Crane and S. Patterson (eds.), The History of the 
Mind-Body Problem, p. 197. 
  
19 The defense just mentioned itself has a controversial premise – the premise 
that indiscriminability is transitive. This has been defended by Graff (2001), but 
is widely thought to be shown false by cases of the sort discussed in the next 
section. 
  
20 For assumptions that there are cases structured like the one described, see N. 
Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, 1st edn., Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1951 and D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind, London: 
Routledge, 1968. For dissent, see D. Graff, ‘Phenomenal Continuaa and the 
Sorites’, Mind (2001); D. Raffman, ‘Is Indistinguishability Non-transitive?’, 
Philosophical Topics 28(1) (Spring 2001), pp. 153–175. 
  
21 I take it that the heart of the controversy being ignored concerns whether the 
relation in question is transitive or not; simplifying assumptions about what form 
it takes won’t change anything. 
  
22 For helpful comments on earlier drafts, thanks to Alex Byrne and Bernard 
Nickel. For extensive discussion of every issue discussed here, thanks to Maja Spener, Scott Sturgeon, and 
David Chalmers. Additional thanks to the last two for criticizing later drafts. Finally, many thanks are due 
to Mike Martin, for writing such a rich and rewarding paper, and for so many nice discussions of it before 
and during the 2002 Oberlin Colloquium. 
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